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Abstract. Background. There is a historical narrative of fear surrounding cyber-
crime. This has extended to cryptocurrencies (CCs), which are often viewed as a 
criminal tool. Aim. To carry out the first user study of CCs for illicit activity, 
from the perspective of underground and dark net forums. Method. We con-
ducted a qualitative study, using a content analysis method, of 16,405 under-
ground and dark net forum posts selected from CrimeBB, a dataset of 100 million 
posts curated by the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre. Results. Firstly, finality of 
payments emerged as a major motivator for the use of CCs. Second, we propose 
an Operational Security Taxonomy for Illicit Internet Activity to show that CCs 
are only one part of several considerations that combine to form security in illicit 
internet transactions. Third, the dark net is hard to use and requires significant 
study, specialist equipment and advanced knowledge to achieve relative security. 
Conclusion. We argue that finality is the main advantage of CCs for this user 
group, not anonymity as widely thought. The taxonomy shows that banning CCs 
is unlikely to be effective. Finally, we contend that the dark net is a niche for 
criminal activity and fears over cybercrime cause the threat to be exaggerated. 
Keywords: Bitcoin, Cryptocurrencies, Underground and Dark Net Forums, 
User Studies, Cybercrime, Security. 
1 Introduction 
On the 25 February 2015, the Superintendent of New York State’s Department of Fi-
nancial Services (DFS) delivered a speech at Columbia Law School about the role of 
regulators after the Great Financial Crisis. In a section on cyber security in the financial 
sector, the Superintendent made clear the extent of his department’s fears: 
 
We are concerned that within the next decade (or perhaps sooner) we will experience 
an Armageddon-type cyber event that causes a significant disruption in the financial 
system for a period of time – what some have termed a “cyber 9/11”. [1] 
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On the very same day, DFS released its revised proposed rules for businesses with CC 
services; the so-called ‘Bitlicense’ regulation, which came into force a few months 
later. This highlights the rhetoric of extreme fear that often surrounds matters of cyber-
crime. Indeed, for several decades there were predictions that ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’, 
to which Thomas Rid responded that ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’ [2]. 
 The narrative surrounding CCs has also often been security led, providing ample 
material for the media. Stories have run of the FBI’s fears of Bitcoin’s popularity with 
criminals [3], of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve commenting that CCs are ‘great 
if you are trying to hide or launder money’ [4] or even more recently, in 2019, when 
CCs made headlines when described as a national security threat by the US Treasury 
Secretary [5]. There is a War on Terror, a War on Drugs, and also a long-standing 
struggle between the state and those that desire privacy through strong encryption. If 
you add to this concern over control of one of mankind’s most important constructs – 
money – then CCs find themselves amongst several of the world’s most hotly contested 
debates; in no small part, due to their connection with illicit activity on the dark net. 
 Yet, some 11 years after Bitcoin was invented, CCs have not played a critical role in 
a Cyber War, a Cyber 9/11, or been responsible for an explosion in dark net crime that 
threatens society. The DFS Superintendent said of virtual currencies in a 2013 interview 
that ‘it feels as if the major advantage they’re providing is anonymity’ [6]. And in evi-
dence given in 2014, DFS was told that illicit activity using virtual currencies ‘reduces 
or even eliminates practical barriers to entry’ thereby enabling the purchase of drugs 
globally with ‘essentially the push of a button’ [7]. There is little dispute that CCs are 
used for criminal activity, but how useful are they really? Is anonymity their major 
advantage? And is purchasing on the dark net as simple as clicking a button? We take 
a social constructivist approach to these questions. What do the users themselves say of 
their attitudes and motivations towards the usage of CCs for illicit purposes? 
 We follow this introduction with a background section to highlight the importance 
of this topic. We examine some existing user studies of CCs and also some wider work 
on the dark net. This exposes the gap in the literature that we aim to address through 
three research questions. Methodology and ethical considerations were key to research-
ing a sensitive subject and so we consider these aspects in detail. We then discuss our 
results, which are achieved through analysis of underground and dark net forum posts. 
Our study presents several implications for policy, before closing with the conclusion. 
2 Background 
2.1 User Studies 
CCs are an important topic of research. The world is moving increasingly towards a 
digital future and the methods with which we transact have undergone more evolution 
in the last 100 years than the previous two millennia [8]. The very form of money is 
changing; from new initiatives like Facebook’s Libra to the prospect of Central Bank 
Digital Currencies. Bitcoin emerged amongst this change, at some level in response to 
the Great Financial Crisis but also ‘as a symptom of monetary plurality in the twenty-
first century’ [9]. The control of money, the form and properties of money, the relation-
ship of money to society; all have emerged as important topics in recent years. 
Early academic interest in Bitcoin was largely technical, as the original CC seem-
ingly delivered on a long past of cryptographic endeavour and previous attempts to 
build digital cash [8]. The examination of CCs focussed on issues such as their ability 
to scale and their security – prompting calls from several researchers for more to be 
done from a social perspective [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. A number of studies of user expe-
riences of CCs have now been conducted. One of the first surveys of Bitcoin users was 
a web-survey of 7500 students. Amongst that group, politics and Libertarianism were 
an influence for using Bitcoin, whilst novelty was more of a draw than anonymity. The 
study concludes that Bitcoin means different things to different people [11]. Whilst this 
seems a simple observation, it is telling as there is a tendency in the debate about CCs 
to make sweeping statements, such as that CCs are a tool for criminals. The reality is, 
of course, more nuanced and varied.  It is only by researching different groups that we 
can learn of the different attitudes and motivations that invariably exist between them. 
 In another earlier study of 1000 users, almost half identified as Libertarian [15]. This 
political dimension was also identified in a 2013 investigation of Bitcoin from a semi-
otics perspective, which analysed archived conversations of those involved in Bitcoin. 
The researchers showed that Bitcoin ‘provides an alternative to currencies and payment 
systems that are seen to threaten users’ privacy, limit personal liberty, and undermine 
the value of money through state and corporate oversight’ [16]. Many other studies 
have now taken place to understand user experiences and motivations for using CCs, 
usually employing interview or web-survey methods [12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22]. In 2015, 
researchers used the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) to organise their results; 
interviewees expressed concerns over ease of use, and one merchant worried about 
price volatility. In terms of usefulness, low cost was a major driver, with anonymity not 
viewed as an issue [22]. Several other studies draw similar conclusions but analysed 
from different perspectives, such as human-computer interaction [19, 23, 24, 25]. 
As well as being limited to specific groups, such as students or a country by geogra-
phy, the other main similarity in all these user studies is the focus on legitimate usage. 
There is a gap in the literature concerning the attitudes and motivations of users of CCs 
for illicit purposes. This is particularly important given the security-led concerns that 
are expressed about CCs. This paper addresses this crucial gap by conducting the first 
user study of CCs from an illicit perspective, in order to contribute to the debates about 
their existence. Furthermore, several of the studies discussed took place prior to 2017 
when CCs gathered mainstream attention. This study contributes to recent knowledge 
of views up to late 2019. 
 
2.2 Dark Net Studies 
Usage of CCs on the dark net is an oft-cited concern yet none of the user research 
discussed so far addresses this issue. The dark net is a rich area of study but, again, the 
use of CCs on them is a largely neglected subject. Although there is a suggestion that 
‘cryptomarkets’ will increase the volume of illegal substances for sale, researchers chal-
lenge the assumption that this will only increase harm [26]. Drug quality can be higher 
and physical violence lower on dark net markets [27]. Policy makers must give careful 
thought to the dark net, as the effects of it are not universally negative. 
Another interesting study reveals that the risk of arrest is also reduced on the dark 
net; there were only 391 arrests worldwide up to December 2016 [26]. This is a modest 
figure and should be borne in mind in relation to the findings of Kethineni, Cao and 
Dodge [28], who conclude, in their work applying space transition theory to Bitcoin 
usage on the dark net, that a lack of deterrence is one attraction of the internet to crim-
inal behaviour. Indeed, research suggests that trade on markets increased after media 
coverage of successful law enforcement action on the Silk Road [29]. The research 
community notes that there is a lack of work assessing the effectiveness of strategies 
towards illicit markets [30]. Is it that CC properties enable dark net activity or is the 
problem more due to a lack of deterrence? Interestingly Bancroft and Reid [31] note, 
with regard to dark net anonymity, that this property is not a precondition for internet 
drug selling as drug trading exists on the internet without attempts to hide identity. 
 The dark net has proven to be a popular area of research for social scientists. A sig-
nificant part of the literature focusses on the drugs dimension, in reflection of the status 
of this topic in wider society. This study adds to this knowledge with a focus on the 
payment mechanism, which is seldom discussed. It is important for policy makers to 
understand the role that CCs play on the dark net, as they consider the risks they pose. 
3 Research Questions 
This research seeks to explore attitudes and motivations towards the use of cryptocur-
rencies. To do this, we aimed to carry out the first user study of cryptocurrencies (CCs) 
for illicit activity, from the perspective of underground and dark net forum users. We 
do not seek to make any moral or legal judgement on the actions of any individuals but 
use the term ‘illicit activity’ as other researchers have done [32], as a collective term to 
aid discussion of a variety of actions on the internet, such as buying illegal drugs on a 
dark net market. The following three sub-questions were chosen in support of our aim: 
 
Q1. What properties of cryptocurrencies are important to users for illicit activity? 
Q2. What are users’ attitudes and experiences of using CCs for illicit activity? 
Q3. To what extent are CCs an enabler of illicit underground and dark net activity? 
4 Research Method 
4.1 Data Collection Method 
In Gehl’s field guide for studying the dark net [33] the author implores for more ‘hu-
manistic inquiry’ and provides advice based on many years of studying this location of 
research. Gehl notes that ethnographic work on the dark net has mainly focussed on 
marketplaces and not on other sites, such as ‘forums and social networking sites’ [33]. 
These forums are places where discussion about the dark net takes place, including how 
to use the system [33]. This includes discussion of cryptocurrencies, as the main 
payment method of the dark net. This study explores the attitudes and motivations to-
wards the usage of cryptocurrencies and so forums and social networking sites were 
chosen as the most suitable research targets. Of particular relevance here, in terms of 
illicit activity, are underground forums on the internet (such as hacker sites) and forums 
on the dark net which require specialist software (such as the Tor browser) to access.  
There are two broad strategies used by researchers to gather information on forums. 
The first is active engagement with users; however, this comes with significant ethical 
and practical implications but also with greater potential risk to participants and even 
researcher safety [34].  The second broad strategy is without active engagement. This 
can involve a bespoke scraping (downloading data) of target websites but there are also 
repositories of these scrapes available for research use. Considering researcher reflec-
tivity and positionality, we selected using a repository of scraped data as the most ap-
propriate strategy, as there were no advantages to the other methods for this study. 
 
4.2 Sample Selection 
There are a number of scraped datasets available for research. Gehl describes one 50GB 
source covering dates between 2011-2015 [33]. Another extensive dataset called 
CrimeBB has been assembled by Cambridge University’s Cybercrime Centre (CCC). 
This dataset has been professionally curated and covers a more extensive period. For 
these reasons, it was chosen as the sample for research. CrimeBB was created in recog-
nition of the fact that prior research had relied on insufficient and out of date datasets 
[35]. Furthermore, underground forums provide a place for criminals to discuss and 
exchange information, products and services – as such, they help researchers better un-
derstand ‘behaviours of offenders and pathways into crime’ [36].  
CCC makes CrimeBB available to other researchers ‘under a legal agreement, de-
signed to prevent misuse and provide safeguards for ethical research’ [35]. The dataset 
continues to grow as more forums are included. In 2019, CrimeBB had data from fifteen 
underground forums, such as Hackforums which is the largest of its kind in the English 
language [37]. CrimeBB also includes dark net forum data. As such, the dataset is one 
of the largest available to researchers, covering a wide timespan and a variety of differ-
ent internet and dark net forums. Several research papers are connected to the CrimeBB 
dataset [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The first task was to download a SQL dump for each forum available from CCC. These 
were then restored in a Postgres database. In total, data from 18 underground and dark 
net forums were added, amounting to some 100 million posts. Search terms were then 
employed as SQL statements to focus the relevancy of the data. Using ‘Bitcoin’ as an 
initial search term produced a selection that was still more than 200,000 posts. As a 
test, we coded a selection of 100 posts and found that took one hour. To code all the 
‘Bitcoin’ posts would take in the region of one year of full-time work. Another factor 
that influenced selection strategy was the disparity in the size of the forum dumps. The 
largest forum accounted for approximately 80 per cent of the 100 million posts, whilst 
the smallest produced less than 100 posts containing ‘Bitcoin’. 
Based on the coding test and the results for each forum using the ‘Bitcoin’ search 
term, we adopted the following method to obtain our selection for coding and analysis. 
For any forum with more than 2000 ‘Bitcoin’ results, ‘Bitcoin’ was combined with 
other search terms to reduce the results. For small forums with less than 2000 ‘Bitcoin’ 
results, these other terms were searched for in addition to ‘Bitcoin’. The effect being to 
widen search terms for small forums and combine search terms for larger forums. 
‘Bitcoin’ was chosen as the ‘master’ search term as it is the overwhelmingly domi-
nant CC. As the first of its type, there would also have been many years of posts where 
it was the only CC. To select other search terms, the 200,000 ‘Bitcoin’ posts were then 
analysed using IBM SPSS Modeler’s text analytics capabilities. This offers an auto-
categorisation of content. By reviewing the categorisations by order of content volume, 
we identified new search terms of interest. We also then added a further three related 
terms based on experience. The following table shows the final search terms, which 
resulted in a total selection of 23,223 posts: 
Table 1. Final Search Term Selection 





Bitcoin Money Zcash Dash 
 BTC Police Feds 
 Cryptocurrency Criminal Jail 
 Monero Privacy Coin  
 
The posts were then exported to Microsoft Excel. Here, 180 posts were removed as they 
no longer had discernible forum identifiers. Duplicates were also then removed result-
ing in a final 16,405 posts, equating to 164 hours of estimated coding time. Coding is 
central to most qualitative data analysis and software tools are often used to assist [42]. 
We attempted to use Nvivo but found that it took too long to process codes. After con-
sidering other options, QDA Miner Lite was selected for coding and analysis. 
5 Ethics 
Ethical considerations were central to the design of this study, as sites of illicit activity 
need extra consideration for participants and researchers. There is a risk of personal 
harm and also the potential to stray into illegal activity [34]. Using CrimeBB minimised 
many risks. The ethical principles of the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) 
were also used to assess the implications of the research conducted in the study [43]. A 
key point raised by AoIR is about expectations of privacy. This is a contested issue but 
a widely held position is that ‘informed consent is not legally required to access data 
from publicly available forums, as they are in the public domain’ [44]. There has been 
extensive research on internet forums, and of CrimeBB, so we did not seek informed 
consent. Other significant considerations highlighted by AoIR were minimised in this 
study. There was no interaction with any individuals from the dataset, which alone 
eliminated a great deal of risk and negates the need for a communications strategy. 
The guidance of the British Society of Criminology (BSC) [45] also informed the 
methodology. Even though forums are public, information gained from the internet 
‘should always be critically examined and the identity of individuals protected unless 
it is a salient aspect of the research’ [45]. This research aims to explore group behaviour 
and usage of cryptocurrencies, it is not necessary, therefore, to identify users by their 
usernames. Furthermore, the British Sociological Association [44] advises that data 
from online forums should not be copied verbatim. This research abides by the guidance 
of both organisations and does not present usernames or verbatim quotations.  
BSC provides further ethical guidance concerning the law and obligations for re-
searchers. In the UK, individuals (including researchers) are not legally obliged to re-
port crimes they witness to the police unless an act relates to terrorism, child abuse or 
money laundering [45]. The nature of the data analysed here was unlikely to relate to 
the first two categories. One advantage of using a professionally curated dataset is that 
images are often removed as part of the scraping process. This reduces the chance of 
viewing certain types of data. The obligation with regards to money laundering relates 
to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and relates primarily to the regulatory sector [45]. 
An ethics note by the University of Sheffield also comments that most information col-
lected by researchers is likely to amount to intelligence or hearsay – it is not ‘hard proof 
of criminality’ [46]. There was, therefore, a negligible chance that this research re-
vealed anything that would cause concern with respect to the obligations mentioned. 
However, if that likelihood had occurred then the protocol would have been to discuss 
any material with University staff before taking further action. A full ethics review of 
this study was approved by the University’s Research Ethics Committee. 
6 Results and Analysis 
Neither usernames nor verbatim quotations are used in this paper. In this section, where 
a specific post from CrimeBB is discussed, we use the term ‘author’ generically in lieu 
of any username connected to a post.  
 
6.1 It’s About Finality, not Anonymity 
Cryptocurrencies present a user with an alternative financial system with differentiated 
properties. Among the key properties are anonymity (or pseudonymity), speed, low-
cost (usually), decentralisation (no third-parties), self-sovereignty, immutability of the 
blockchain and finality [8]. We define finality here as a payment transaction that, once 
made, cannot practically be undone. For the university students surveyed by Bashir, 
Strickland and Bohr [11], there was a political motivation towards usage and novelty 
was a greater draw than anonymity. But how does this view change amongst different 
user groups with different needs and wants? Specifically, which properties were most 
important for adoption of cryptocurrencies by underground and dark net forum users? 
 Whilst anonymity generally is important to those conducting illicit activities, it was 
the property of finality that emerged strongly from the coding. Many authors spoke of 
difficulties with using traditional finance and discussion about PayPal, in particular, 
was of note. It is difficult in a predominantly qualitative work such as this to 
quantitatively support what, at a certain level, is something of a subjective judgement 
that arose from analysing the posts. However, some key search terms were submitted 
into QDA using the text retrieval function in order to give the reader a sense of the 
frequency that certain terms appeared in the 16,405 posts, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Total number of posts containing the selected search term 
 


































The meaning derived from this table is crude, but it is useful in discussion of the prop-
erties that were important to the users of this study. Of note, there was very little dis-
cussion observed of the Libertarian or Cypherpunk ideals that are often mentioned in 
connection to CCs. The other figures from Table 2 need to be handled cautiously. Some 
terms, like ‘speed’ and ‘cost’, appear relatively frequently but may have been used in 
many different contexts among the posts. Others, such as ‘decentralis(z)ed’, were pre-
sent in many ‘generic’ posts that served as introductions to CCs. In contrast, the diffi-
culty that many users had with traditional finance stood large as a theme in its own 
right. The term ‘chargeback’ is singular in its meaning compared to ‘cost’ for example, 
which caused it to emerge, along with ‘PayPal’, as significant codes of interest. Nota-
bly, neither of these terms were used in the initial filtering of posts from CrimeBB. 
 In 2014, PayPal extended the time to raise a dispute from 45 to 180 days. The feeling 
among many authors on CrimeBB was that this was great for scammers and terrible for 
sellers - the issue being that a trade could be made, only for a buyer to complain later 
causing accounts and funds to be frozen. Furthermore, the view was that third parties 
tended to side with the buyer rather than the seller. The result was that many people 
looked for alternatives without chargebacks – Bitcoin was one of several useful solu-
tions. In 2014 when Bitcoin was relatively unknown, there were sellers considering 
accepting only Bitcoin despite the fear of losing most of their customers by rejecting 
more accepted payment methods. It is also important to note that this issue was not 
limited to illicit activity - a lot of this discussion took place on the underground forums, 
even as far back as 2012 where authors had problems using Liberty Reserve. Discussion 
also highlighted some of the other reasons why people were frustrated with traditional 
finance and sought alternatives: PayPal, for example, is not supported in every country, 
under 18s are restricted from many financial services and others talked of their prob-
lems using existing services after having had previous financial difficulty. All these 
experiences led to the adoption of Bitcoin (primarily) as a tool open to all. 
 One limitation of CrimeBB is the periods covered. Underground forum posts are 
from as early as 2010, whilst the dark net forums date from 2014 onwards†. We are not, 
therefore, able to see dark net posts from the very early days of Bitcoin or indeed of the 
Silk Road era. However, there is a crossover from the underground forums where these 
matters are discussed. Much is also known of the dark net and the Silk Road from these 
times from existing research, where Bitcoin was long established as a payment mecha-
nism for trade. And it was and is the finality of transactions that has been at the heart 
of Bitcoin’s acceptance for illicit activity as it overcomes one of the difficulties of the 
internet – that of trust. As one author puts it, there is little trust on the internet. Another 
urges others to trust in cryptography over anything a human might say. Finality, with 
an immutable public ledger, enabled trust to increase, above that of the alternatives that 
existed at the time. Authors note that they could verify funds had been sent and be 
secure knowing they would not suffer chargebacks or other problems - a situation en-
hanced further with escrow and eventually multi-signature transactions. 
 The volume of posts, and their strength and tone, caused finality to emerge as the 
most useful property of CCs. This finding aligns with Anderson’s paper pre-dating 
Bitcoin that ‘reveals that revocability is more important’ than traceability for online 
fraudsters using ‘nonbank payment services’ [47]. Speed was not a top concern in our 
sample when, in the case of purchasing drugs on the dark net as an example, packages 
were to arrive by post. Reduced cost of transactions was an attractive feature, but lower 
down the order than the benefits of finality. The other structural characteristics of 
Bitcoin contribute to achieving this benefit but were not the overt reason why it was 
adopted – finality solved real problems of existing alternatives. But what of anonymity? 
Was this not the main advantage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies as many believe? 
 
6.2 Anonymity Isn’t Everything 
Table 2 shows that anonymity is a frequent term in posts. The dark net forums, in par-
ticular, are dense with discussions about operational security, or how not to get caught. 
A first important point authors note is that complete anonymity is impossible to achieve 
– the best that can be hoped for is sufficient security to be practically safe. Secondly, 
anonymity is achieved through a raft of measures, not solely through one method such 
as the payment mechanism. A layering of protection is needed to create obscurity. 
(There will be more on this in the following sub-sections). These are important distinc-
tions, as anonymity is not, therefore, the ‘main advantage’ offered by CCs. They can 
aid in the endeavour but do not solve the issue in its entirety. 
 
†  One of the foreign language dark net forums has posts as far back as 2012. 
 Analysis of CrimeBB is also interesting from a longitudinal perspective, as we ob-
serve the changes in attitude and behaviour towards CCs. It also reveals the spectrum 
of user knowledge about the properties of CCs and how to use them for illicit activity. 
There is strong evidence from 2011/12 that many users believed that Bitcoin was fully 
anonymous. They were likely using the Silk Road thinking that tracking or any form of 
identification was not possible. Despite this, there were other users, as early as 2012, 
who were aware of the pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin. In one such post, an author 
expresses his exasperation that others keep claiming that Bitcoin is completely anony-
mous. There is a clear difference in understanding between those that are technically 
savvy and well-read, and those who are not. To those that are not, there was a belief 
that Bitcoin was as anonymous as cash and served that purpose as ‘cash on the internet’. 
Posts show that users felt it was anonymous as they did not have to provide a genuine 
name when creating a wallet. 
 By 2014, the underground forums evidence a widespread recommendation to use 
third party ‘tumbler or mixer’ services with Bitcoin as the prevailing method to increase 
the obscurity of any trail. Ultimately though, as one author explains, Bitcoin is only as 
anonymous as the individual behind it. Despite this, claims of Bitcoin’s complete ano-
nymity continue through all years, as well as posts of disbelief at this lack of knowledge. 
Remarkably, in 2019 there is even evidence that users were buying CCs on regulated 
exchanges with real-world details and then sending funds directly to illicit sites. There 
is a noticeable difference between the underground and dark net forums in these mat-
ters. In general, the dark net forums are heavily dominated by operational security dis-
cussion and so are much more aware of the issues and take them more seriously. This 
makes sense and Tor appears to filter some of the banality that the easier access of 
underground forums enables. 
 Using tumblers continued to be a widespread practice from 2014 to 2016. After this 
time, however, users moved away from this method, citing trust (some services have 
control of your funds and can disappear with them) and also efficacy – you may be 
mixing your ‘dirty’ coin and receiving another ‘dirty’ coin in return. In 2017, one of 
the main tumblers closed their services as they changed their philosophy, realising that 
Bitcoin was intended as a transparent system. This change also aligns with the other 
significant development of this time, which was the emergence of privacy coins, de-
signed with enhanced anonymity in mind in comparison to Bitcoin. 
 Table 2 is again a useful reference at this point. Dash, or Darkcoin as it was previ-
ously known, had some prominence in the 2014-15 period but posts show that users 
moved from it, questioning if its technology enabled any more security than Bitcoin. 
Instead, it was Monero that emerged as the most talked-about privacy coin of choice. 
By 2018, there was a marked clamour about the use of Monero, with some proclaiming 
it the rescuer and future of dark net markets. This is supported by Monero’s daily trans-
action chart, which has been on an upward trend since early 2019 and now regularly 
records more daily transactions than the peak of the 2017 bubble [48]. Despite the in-
creased security on offer from Monero, Bitcoin retains its prominence even on dark net 
markets. Why is this the case? That is exactly the question that many authors pose. In 
2018, one author commented that Monero was not an option on many markets. A 2019 
post notes that Bitcoin is awful for anonymity or privacy. It also becomes noticeable at 
this time that there is anger towards Bitcoin as users cannot understand why anyone 
would use it for illicit activity when it has a traceable, public ledger. There are even 
outright calls and advice to stop using it on the dark net. Others thought it obsolete in 
terms of the privacy it offers and even described it as terrible for illicit activity. 
 Several explanations arise. Firstly, there are the network effects that Bitcoin has 
achieved. It is the CC that is universally available and accepted. People have also learnt 
how to use it over 11 years of operation. One seller questions the ability of buyers to 
use a new currency (Monero), suggesting it would be easier to accept Bitcoin and take 
responsibility for anonymity as part of their own operational security. Another user 
explains that there is no cyber law enforcement in their country, meaning there is noth-
ing to worry about if using Bitcoin. This question of deterrence also emerges in many 
other posts. The widespread opinion is that law enforcement only cares about large dark 
net participants – if you are a buyer of small quantities then again Bitcoin will probably 
do. Similarly, another author states that major criminals do not need Bitcoin and that it 
is a poor tool for money laundering. Some other users fall into the categories of careless, 
misinformed, stupid, entrenched and even lazy, as author explanations for the continued 
use of Bitcoin. Additionally, Monero is viewed as harder to get and to use than Bitcoin. 
Users also worry that a connection to Monero looks suspicious. In a 2019 post, another 
author asks why anyone would use Monero, as none of the markets had multi-signature 
transactions – leaving participants to run the risk of market exit scams. One final post 
gets to the crux of the issue – the main advantage of Bitcoin is not anonymity. 
 That Bitcoin is still widely used even though it is common knowledge that it does 
not offer strong anonymity is prima facie evidence that this is not the main advantage 
on offer. To return to a point made earlier, anonymity is not and should not be sought 
from one element of activity. It takes many aspects of operational security to achieve 
sufficient anonymity – that is, a transparent currency can be used for an illicit payment 
as long as other countermeasures are used. For example, a user could acquire a currency 
with fraudulent details; in this case, it does not matter that the transaction is not anon-
ymous. And so it is with Bitcoin and CCs. The payment mechanism is only one part of 
a whole set of other considerations that work to achieve the desired anonymity. It is not 
singularly important for Bitcoin to be anonymous – if it was, it would not be used. In 
this way, we can say that dark net markets are not dependent on CCs or a perceived 
advantage of anonymity. They can survive without this necessity. 
 How, though, is this possible? The following sub-sections will explore this in more 
detail. For now, we can summarise that illicit activity requires an overall level of ano-
nymity, but this is not achieved through Bitcoin or a privacy coin. In this way, Bitcoin 
can be pseudonymous and still be used, as long as other methods are employed. Privacy 
coins enhance anonymity, but they are still not a singular solution. Countless posts 
(amongst those that care) take place on underground and dark net forums discussing 
how to best transact. This will now be examined. 
 
6.3 The Payment Mechanism 
The payment mechanism used to conduct illicit activity is just one of a suite of consid-
erations that a conscientious user must scrutinise if they hope to achieve a sufficient 
level of operational security. To aid discussion of this, we propose an Operational Se-
curity Taxonomy for Illicit Internet Activity, shown in Fig. 1. As the reader can see, 
there is a great deal to consider if you seek to conduct illicit activity as securely as 
possible. The seven areas of security are not exhaustive but capture the main elements 
that contribute towards relative anonymity. The dashed boxes are also not exhaustive 
but illustrate some of the considerations in each area. At the top, there is a cross-cutting 
theme of ‘procedures’, which applies to all seven security areas. For example, a proce-
dure may be implemented to erase all hard disks weekly, or in relation to shipping to 
ensure that a home address is free of illicit material prior to an expected delivery. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Operational Security Taxonomy for Illicit Internet Activity 
Our focus here is on the payment mechanism. We begin with the following claim – 
banning CCs would not materially reduce illicit internet activity. In many areas of the 
taxonomy, we can think of there being ‘tools for the job’. The history seen through 
CrimeBB shows that when one payment mechanism falls, another is quickly found. 
When Liberty Reserve ceased, other options were soon adopted. As difficulties with 
traditional finance grew, demand for Bitcoin increased. And now, as Bitcoin is scruti-
nised, many want to move to Monero. There are always alternative payment mecha-
nisms. Table 3 highlights some of those used in CrimeBB. 
Table 3. Selection of Payment Mechanisms in CrimeBB 
Payment Type Example Mechanisms 
Cryptocurrencies Bitcoin/Litecoin/Monero/Dash/Zcash 
Payment Processors PayPal, Western Union, MoneyGram, Skrill (Moneybook-
ers), Payza, Webmoney, Moneypak, 
Bearer Assets Cash, Gift Cards 
Fintech Perfectmoney, Cashapp, Venmo, Greendot, Dwolla, Perfect-
money, UKash, Virwox, Paysafecard 
Gaming Currency Runescape Gold, Second Life Linden Dollars 
Traditional Finance Bank Account, Credit/Debit Cards, Prepaid Debit Cards, 
Polish Bank Cards 
 
The table shows that a ban on CCs would only restrict one potential mechanism, leaving 
several other options. If we consider just the bearer type, we see that it is an ultimate 
recourse should every other type become unavailable. Bearer assets are owned by the 
holder and so offer a finality of transaction, like CCs. Cash is the most common exam-
ple and finality explains why ‘cash is still king’ for criminal transactions [8]. Indeed, 
as several authors point out, cash is the main mechanism for purchasing drugs more 
widely. Another author describes successfully sending cash through the mail system – 
established techniques such as this would be extremely difficult to counter and exist as 
proven payment mechanisms should other methods disappear. Gift cards are another 
readily available bearer mechanism discussed and used in a multitude of posts. 
 Several authors question the logic of a ban on CCs. They view cash as being a greater 
enabler of criminal activity than CCs and believe there is a hypocrisy in targeting CCs 
over cash or the traditional financial system. Authors acknowledge that CCs are used 
in crime but ask if that is different from any other payment mechanism. It is worth 
noting at this point the central role that cash also plays in illicit internet activity. Not 
only is it used as a payment mechanism, it also acts as a fundamental tool for achieving 
anonymity. One of the most discussed topics, particularly on the dark net forums, is the 
subject of ‘cashing in or out’ of CCs. As CCs are still a relatively small market and not 
accepted widely in the world, authors describe the need to transfer any CCs into and 
out of cash for use in the real world. In this way, cash can often be thought of as the 
anonymity wrapper applied around a pseudonymous Bitcoin transaction. This again 
explains why anonymity is not the main property needed from CCs as an illicit payment 
mechanism - as long as anonymity can be achieved elsewhere as part of the process. 
 In fact, the increasing difficulties of cashing in/out, arguably brought on by improv-
ing regulation of legitimate CC services, has deterred some illicit activity. One author 
describes being put off from selling on the dark net due to this difficulty of cashing out. 
There is a further interesting paradox to consider about the efficacy of bans. Currently, 
most illicit transactions have a connection to legitimate services. This brings oppor-
tunity for enforcement. However, a ban would likely push users to illicit mechanisms 
and reduce some of these opportunities. Cash can be sent in the mail or deposited into 
a bank account. Or legitimate mechanisms would be used fraudulently, such as regis-
tering for services using fake identification. These methods are harder to stop and ar-
guably leave less opportunity for enforcement. In this way, a ban would reduce oppor-
tunity for legitimate users and merely push illicit activity towards other established 
mechanisms that are harder to control. Dark net market activity would be temporarily 
affected but users would likely soon find alternatives, as they have done after Liberty 
Reserve ceased or the repeated closure of markets themselves. Legitimate services drain 
liquidity away from illicit methods, making them rarer and harder to use. 
 Finally, policy makers must consider whether they could even achieve a ban. The 
nature of CCs means that they cannot be shut down as easily as a centralised service 
like Liberty Reserve. And as long as a decentralised CC system persists, there is little 
that can be done about individuals meeting in the real-world to trade CCs for cash, for 
example. As one author puts it, criminals could still use Bitcoin if it was banned and 
only ordinary users would be affected. Another writes that Bitcoin is simple for 
legitimate activity but hard for illicit. Regulated exchanges combined with a transparent 
record of transactions make illicit payments harder. On this point, an author writes that 
analysis of the Bitcoin blockchain has been central to all dark net market prosecution 
and that, if you use Bitcoin, you must ensure that every aspect of your operational se-
curity is infallible. In another post, the author decries the hype around CCs or that they 
are revolutionary to simply say that they are just a useful tool to transact with, like other 
monies. CCs are, then, useful for illicit activity as they are a useful payment mechanism. 
But it is too simple to say they are ‘great’ for criminals - there is far more to consider 
in terms of their usage. They are a tool among many, as the taxonomy shows, but as an 
individual mechanism, they come with significant disadvantages to the illicit actor. 
 
6.4 Dark Nets are Hard 
A recent research paper that also analysed CrimeBB came to the conclusion that ‘cy-
bercrime is (often) boring’ [41]. To this, we add that cybercrime, particularly on the 
dark net, is hard. The dark net is fraught with risk – scammers abound, and law enforce-
ment action has been successful to an extent. The taxonomy shows that there is a sig-
nificant educational and technical barrier in order to illicitly transact relatively securely 
on the internet. Even for a careless user, the minimum required to use the dark net is a 
computer with Tor set up, a delivery address and a working knowledge and possession 
of CCs. We contend, therefore, that dark net markets are a niche and are unlikely to 
grow significantly in comparison to traditional counterparts. The dark net may reduce 
risk in acquiring narcotics, for example, but it is arguably much easier, as some of the 
authors claim, to get cash and buy drugs in the real-world. Dark net markets only cater 
for a small volume of overall crime [8] – the threat should not be overexaggerated. 
 There are countless guides and posts on the underground and dark net forums dis-
cussing how to conduct illicit transactions. Even just the payment mechanism part of 
the taxonomy requires substantial knowledge. Users must also keep up with changing 
methodologies as services come and go, regulation tightens, and behaviours evolve. 
One author describes studying for many months before being able to start selling on a 
market. Another author tells of mental exhaustion from researching how to buy. The 
author thought it would be simple, perhaps as easy as ‘pushing a button’ - the reality 
was the opposite. There is no better example of this than the Dark Net Market’s Buyer 
Bible [49]. This is a guide written for users wanting to purchase on dark net markets – 
it is 133 pages long. We cannot discuss the Bible or the taxonomy in full detail from a 
buyer’s or seller’s perspective as it would be too long but here follows a few items that 
highlight some of the complexity involved: use a non-windows, Linux based machine 
for a specialist operating system such as Tails or Whonix on a portable media 
(USB/CD), acquire a VPN service anonymously, learn to use PGP for encryption, use 
pre-installed IP tables as needed, disable JavaScript in the browser, get onion addresses 
from a reputable website, use a self-destructing messaging service, acquire BTC using 
cash from an ATM using a disguise and burner phone, convert Bitcoin to Monero using 
a non-exchange wallet… Advice for sellers is even more exhausting. 
 This also shows why privacy coins are not a panacea for anonymity. The user must 
acquire the Monero, for example, most probably with Bitcoin. Websites exist to 
highlight services such as VPN providers and decentralised exchanges that aid in ano-
nymity [50]. For example, a popular service on CrimeBB is xmr.to, which will send 
Bitcoin to a recipient in exchange for Monero. Or morphtoken.com which exchanges 
cryptocurrencies e.g. Monero for Bitcoin. However, even with these tools a user still 
needs to cash in/out, plus do every other part of the taxonomy securely. It is a difficult 
task. 
 We must also consider the environment of the dark net itself. One user from the early 
days commented on how much more difficult it had become. Whilst there was early 
disdain about law enforcement capability, authors now acknowledge much improve-
ment since the Silk Road market. There is evidence of some fear of law enforcement 
activity. However, an author notes in 2014 that arrest is more likely in the real-world. 
As such, the view remains that buyers of small amounts have little to worry about. The 
extent of deterrence on the dark net is therefore limited. Operation has become more 
difficult, but buyers do not think there is much chance of law enforcement interest in 
their activities. The role that Bitcoin analysis has played in prosecution is known but 
sellers continue, believing that they can operate if they take sufficient precaution. Re-
cent views from 2019, though, show that marketplaces are hard to trust and often dis-
appear after short periods. This all leads to a sense of containment if nothing else, as 
authors hope for improved days based on innovation using new technologies. The de-
sire for a truly decentralised marketplace using Monero is there to see. There is a para-
dox here, that every law enforcement success leads to a Darwinian hardening of the 
system, which one day could leave little in way of enforcement opportunity. 
 To finish this section, we consider the words from three final posts. One author re-
minds readers that even if you do everything right (according to the taxonomy), using 
the dark net still requires trust and ‘hope’. Hope that someone else has not done some-
thing to compromise your security, such as a seller that is caught who has not deleted 
customer addresses. Another reminds that people make errors and security cannot be 
applied retrospectively. You must get everything right from the beginning, which is 
difficult and can lead to silly mistakes getting you caught (as in the case of Ross Ul-
bricht). This leads us to the final comment, that the dark net appears to be easy and safe 
to use – but it isn’t. It is a risky domain and it requires a lot of research and capability 
to use it relatively securely. And for these reasons, it is not for everyone. 
7 Discussion 
7.1 Implications for Policy 
This paper challenges the notion that the main advantage of using CCs for illicit activity 
is anonymity. Users adopted CCs because they were a useful tool that solved real-world 
problems. Finality was the property most sought. Policy makers should recognise the 
issues people had that led to this adoption. It is important that traditional systems are 
inclusive and fair to all; they should not drive users to alternative choices. 
 Banning CCs is unlikely to do more than disrupt illicit internet activity. If anything, 
this reduces opportunity for legitimate use, pushes liquidity to illicit methods and re-
duces law enforcement opportunity by reducing contact with regulated systems. There 
are many other payment mechanisms that could be used for illicit activity; some, such 
as cash, are even harder to monitor than CCs. A ban would also likely be ineffective 
due to the decentralised nature of CC systems. 
 Law enforcement action has contained dark net activity and created a degree of de-
terrence, but little at the small buyer level. For these buyers, research shows that the 
dark net may reduce harm. Policy makers must also consider the evolutionary nature of 
markets and the impact that future technology could have on law enforcement impact. 
 Illicit internet activity is hard to achieve relatively securely, as the taxonomy shows. 
Dark net markets are therefore a niche and are unlikely to explode in size. The creators 
of Silk Road and AlphaBay markets were not from traditional crime groups. Policy 
should consider the threat that the dark net measurably poses and react accordingly. 
There is a danger that headlines make it seem more of a threat than it is. It is unlikely 
that dark net markets will capture significant shares of real-world counterparts. 
 
7.2 Limitations 
CrimeBB covers limited periods for each forum, meaning there is a wide range in the 
amount of material available. It is, though, a fantastic resource and our thanks go to 
CCC for their efforts in making this dataset available. It reduces many problems asso-
ciated with research in this domain. 
 Particular care was taken in choosing search terms and using a content analysis 
method enabled themes to emerge naturally. As a qualitative study, we do not claim to 
‘prove’ our findings but justify them based on the reading that emerged. We would 
have liked to have used quotations from posts to show the discussions that led to our 
results, but our ethical guidance advised against this. CrimeBB is, of course, available 
to other researchers should they wish to know more or to reproduce the results. 
8 Conclusion and Future Work 
This research addresses a gap in the literature by conducting the first user study of CCs 
for illicit activity. It also adds to the research on the dark net by focussing on payment 
mechanisms, rather than well-researched aspects such as harm or drug availability. 
 We present several significant findings that have implications for policy. Anonymity 
is not the main advantage of CCs for this user group, finality is. This challenges estab-
lished assumptions and shows the value of qualitative research in this subject. Bitcoin 
is not as anonymous as cash but, in many respects, has proven to be the next best thing 
on the internet for illicit transactions. Is it great for criminals? The answer is a predict-
able yes and no. Yes, in that it proved to be a useful payment mechanism, offering 
finality and open access to those cut off from traditional finance; in the lexicon of TAM, 
it had a utility that led to adoption. No, in that using CCs for illicit activity is difficult, 
they are traceable and the dark net itself can be an inhospitable place. Even privacy 
coins do not solve the anonymity problem; users must still cash in and out and must 
also overcome significant barriers to use CCs relatively safely, as shown by the taxon-
omy. Finally, banning CCs is unlikely to be effective; determined users will switch to 
another payment mechanism, some of which are already established and proven. Or 
they will find a way to continue using CCs. The dark net is a niche; it is not an existen-
tial threat, and neither are CCs. 
Society continues to wrestle with questions of liberty and security. 9/11 shifted us 
towards security and Snowden moved the dial back towards liberty. Debates about 
these issues and the question of balance between them endure - but we need to take care 
in our response to perceived threats [51]. Or, at the very least, continue to look for ways 
‘out of the impasse of security’ [52]. We hope this study contributes to this aim. 
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